

5. All projects must be submitted and passed in order to successfully complete the year. **Any project/assignment not submitted will be marked as a fail.**

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AI Acknowledgement Supplement

[Malware Analysis (H9MWAN)]

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This section is a supplement to the main assignment, to be used if AI was used in any capacity in the creation of your assignment; if you have queries about how to do this, please contact your lecturer. For an example of how to fill these sections out, please click [here](#).

AI Acknowledgment

This section acknowledges the AI tools that were utilized in the process of completing this assignment.

Tool Name	Brief Description	Link to tool

Description of AI Usage

This section provides a more detailed description of how the AI tools were used in the assignment. It includes information about the prompts given to the AI tool, the responses received, and how these responses were utilized or modified in the assignment. **One table should be used for each tool used.**

Evidence of AI Usage

This section includes evidence of significant prompts and responses used or generated through the AI tool. It should provide a clear understanding of the extent to which the AI tool was used in the assignment. Evidence may be attached via screenshots or text.

Additional Evidence:

[Place evidence here]

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Section 1: Malware Lab

Abstract

Based on the requirements of our continues assessment we were required to create a malware analysis lab using best practices , alongside this we were also required to research one assigned malware type for my report this was QBot which is also known as a banking malware , for my report I analyzed existing research and

incorporated this into my overall structure this included process flow analysis , stages of malware injection , and conclusion into how QBot works in a windows environment and what I would do if I had more time to research further into the malware.

1. Introduction

As part of our continuous assessment, we were required to set up and configure a malware analysis lab. The requirement here was to utilize research-based methods in understanding how a malware lab might come to fruition our references could be anything from lab based guides, best practice documentation or perhaps google scholar articles and books. The key point being to utilize recognized trusted methods of configuring our lab to a best practice or standard.

Another one of the key elements was to understand the process involved in configuring the lab environment, this includes everything from your hardware components such as memory, ram, graphics cards, networking cards, motherboards, backplanes, raid configurations, processors and cpu power, surge protection and so on. As part of this process, we were required to reference best practice in the solution and document these.

The lab was also to provide us with a deeper understanding of how you would ensure isolation from your core network without compromising on security, this can be seen as understanding the isolation process from your virtual machines in your lab network to your core network/home network or enterprise network, part of the process was to understand your starting point with configuring your lab network and then securing this and isolating it from all other networks, understanding your network topology was a key part of this exercise.

Safeguards are a key point to consider as part of any lab and network configuration when introducing malware for testing, virtual machine escape is a key security consideration to understand and undertake when securing your test virtual machines, [1] Safeguards are normally introduced as a way of ensuring abnormal behavior doesn't happen and VM Escape is considered a security risk it affects both the integrity and availability of a virtual machine and can cause issues in enterprise environments a virtual machine should not know its virtualized and should definitely not burst out of its vm if a piece of malware could do this it would then be able to control virtual machines on the host and this would be a security incident. Safeguards are a form of protection against this kind of attack and we incorporate this into our design.

As part of the malware analyses best practice, I utilized a research paper and domains such as google scholar to influence my lab setup. As part of my lab, I was required to complete an analysis into existing sandboxes scenarios, document my virtual machine setup's, and

understand what tooling was used to form part of my virtual machines for my test lab and test out some of the features of my lab alongside covering the safe guards and safety procedures i put in place for this.

My Malware lab consisted of many different requirements the first requirement can be described as Hardware requirements, this can include your Firewall appliance, your networking cables, your routers your switches, your internet connection, your hypervisor for storing your virtual machines, your disk storage type and so on.

The next requirement was the balancing act of existing vs new vs used this can be broken down into what you actually have available to you at a present moment which is no cost to implement versus what new equipment you may need to purchase this would be additional to what you already have vs can you purchase equipment at discounted costs or have the ability to purchase re-used equipment. For my lab I based some of the guidance from the book "The Network Security Test Lab: A Step-by-Step Guide by Michael Gregg" [2]

The next requirement was virtual hardware, this could include anything from your Networking setup such as SSID for the wifi, Vlan's, Routers, Virtual network appliances like firewall's and load balancers, access control lists and so on all these take a position in the process for designing your infrastructure with security at the centre often when cybersecurity solution architects are configuring networks they focus on the CIA Triad, confidentiality Integrity Availability [3] also known for being part of the five pillars of information security.

2. Part A: Analysis of Existing Sandbox


Before we get into our Lab configuration we were asked to do an analysis of an existing sandbox, one of these which could be used is called "JoeSandbox", this allows users to compile an analysis on the behaviour runtime of malware within different environment types e.g. windows, Linux, ubuntu and more, the reports the sandbox creates allows you to develop out a defence in depth approach to indicators of compromise, Mitre attack TTP's and more, it also allows you to essential test out file samples and urls and gives you a comprehensive view into how you could protect your environment. [4]

Additional Screenshots are Available at the end/Appendix of this document for this section see FIG 8.8, Joe Sandbox.

3. Part B: Virtual Machine Setup

Our lab consisted of the following two virtual machines one windows server virtual machine and one Kali Linux virtual machine Hosted on my HP Omen PC with Hyper-V manager enabled. Both virtual machines are configured with the below configurations. Outside of the screenshots below additional screenshots have been added to the Appendix of this document for validation purposes.

Diagram Of Full Network: For this I used Draw.io to create the diagram which is an open-source diagram tool software used by IT Professionals to draw out their diagrams. [4]



This is the diagram of my network which is separated out into multiple separate networks in my network I have a quantity of 3 switches 1 firewall and multiple Vlan's , for our use case we will be Soley using the Lab network for both virtual machines in which the network adapter will be connected to port number 8 on my upstairs 16 port Omada switch , I have also configured a rule to block all network traffic from the Lab Network to Any other network I did further testing on this for confirmation at a later stage.


Quick Network Hardware Information Table For Use Case

TP-Link Omada ER8411 Router/Firewall	Internet comes in through this router has dual Wan Failover.	
TP-Link Omada SG-2218P Switch	This is the Down Stair Switch Comms A	Switch Connects to ER8411
TP-Link Omada TL-SG 3428 MP Switch	This is the Up Stair Switch Comms B	Switch Connects to SG 3428
TP-Link Omada SG - 2218 Switch	This is the office Switch	Switch Connects to SG-2218P
TP Link Omada EAP653 X 4 Indoor AP	Access Points Indoor	SSID Available for use case

TP Link Omada EAP225 X1 Outdoor AP	Access Points Outdoor	SSID Available for use case
Omen PC	HyperV Host	HP Desktop/Server

Quick Network Information

Lab Network is 192.168.50.1/24	Vlan ID 50	We will be using this Network as part of the use ca
IOT Network is 192.168.20.1/24	Vlan ID 20	This network will not be used for the use case
Guest Network is 192.168.40.1/24	Vlan ID 40	This network will not be used for the use case
CCTV Network is 192.168.30.1/24	Vlan ID 30	This network will not be used for the use case
Home Network is 192.168.0.1/24	Vlan ID 1	This network will not be used for the use case



Additional Screenshots are Available at the end/Appendix of this document for this section see Fig 1.0 Network configuration.


INDEX	ENABLED	DESCRIPTION	POLICY	PROTOCOL	SOURCE	DIRECTION	ACTION
1	On	Block Lab From All Networks	Deny	All	Network:Lab Network	Network:Lab Network/Default: Off Network: CCTV Network: Guest Network: IOT Network: Home: Lab Network	Deny
2	On	Block IOT From All Networks	Deny	All	Network:IOT Network	Network:Lab Network/Default: Off Network: Guest Network: Lab Network	Deny
3	On	Block CCTV From All Networks	Deny	All	Network:CCTV Network	Network:Lab Network/Default: Off Network: Guest Network: Lab Network	Deny
4	On	Block Guest From All Networks	Deny	All	Network:Guest Network	Network:Lab Network/Default: Off Network: CCTV Network: IOT Network: Lab Network	Deny

Host Hyper-V Machine

This is my Omen-PC used to host all virtual machines this is on a separate Home Network.

OS Version	Windows 11 Pro
System Name	Omen-PC
Build Version	24H2, 26100, 4351
Ram	48GB

Processor	Core i5-10400f
Cpu	2.90 ghz
Cores	6
C Drive Capacity	930GB
D Drive Capacity	1.81TB
E Drive Capacity	931 GB
VM Virtual Network Configuration	IPv4 Address, 192.168.0.16 Subnet Mask, 255.255.255.0 Default Gateway, 192.168.0.1 DNS, 192.168.0.1
System Type	X64
Image	

Range	
Network Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0
Gateway IP:	192.168.50.1
Image	


Our windows virtual machine had a configuration of:

This is the test windows server virtual machine which is hosted on my Omen-PC but connected to a separate VLAN ID Of 50 for the lab network.

Additional Screenshots are Available at the end/Appendix of this document for this section see Fig 2.0 Host Hyper-V Machine

Lab Network Configuration

Vlan ID	50
Gate way IP:	192.168.50.1
Network Broadcast IP	192.168.50.255
Network IP Count	254 Addresses
Network IP	192.168.50.1 - 192.168.50.254

OS Version	Windows Server 2025 Standard
System Name	Server-Test
Build Version	24H2, 26100, 4349
Ram	4GB
Processor	Core i5-10400f
Cpu	2.90 ghz
Cores	3
C Drive Capacity	126GB
VM Virtual Network Configuration	IPv4 Address, 192.168.50.2 Subnet Mask, 255.255.255.0 Default Gateway, 192.168.50.1 DNS 192.168.50.1 
Lab Network Configuration	Gateway IP: 192.168.50.1 Network Broadcast IP 192.168.50.255 Network IP Count 254 Network IP Range 192.168.50.1 - 192.168.50.254 Network Subnet Mask 255.255.255.0

Resource Hacker	5.2.8	Used when looking to do reverse malware analysis or engineering	Allows you to edit icons and text files alongside external files	Resource Hacker
USBCap	1.5.4	Used to capture traffic from usb devices.	The go to application for capturing data in motion for usb devices	USBCap
Win Rar	7.11.0	Used to compress large file quantities in different file formats	Mathematical file compression	Win Rar
WinSCP	6.5.1	Used for the large quantities of data file shares and transfers.	Network adapter was installed on systems	WinSCP
Wireshark	4.4.7	Used to analyse networks , subnets and ranges.	Number one for network packet captures	Wireshark
Autopsy	4.22.1	Used to analyse recover, record and report on disk images for investigation purposes.	Additional Screenshots are Available at the end/Appendix of this document for this section see Fig 7.0 Network Switch HyperV	Autopsy
BinText	3.0.3	Used for reading code and looking for strings in code	Allows you to do analysis on code and extract characters and text from it	BinText
Network Miner	3.0	Used for extracting content from network traffic in transit.	Gives you the ability to pull data from packet captures	Network Miner
Tor Browser	14.5.3	A browser which focuses on hidden privacy across the internet utilising vpn technology, this browser has access to the different forms of the web such as surface, deep, dark	Let's you conduct questionable activity via an anonymous network for research purposes as an ethical professional.	Tor Browser

Additional Screenshots are Available at the end/Appendix of this document for this section see Fig 5.0 software install on windows server 2025 virtual machine.

5. Part D: Lab Testing

So, for my lab I was required to do some testing to ensure that both virtual machines were isolated from my network.

Step 1: IP Allocation and Reservation

The first thing I did was configure a Vlan for the Lab Network, this consisted of the following an Ip address range of 192.168.50.1/24 with a VLAN ID of 50 , both virtual machines were allocated to this network one receiving an IP Address of 192.168.50.2 for the windows server and one receiving an IP Address of 192.168.50.3 for the kali Linux machines , next steps were to reserve the Ip addresses for both of these servers in the dhcp pool's.

Additional Screenshots are Available at the end/Appendix of this document for this section see Fig 6.0 IP Allocation/Reservation

Step 2: Virtual Machine Network Switch Assignment

The go to application for capturing data in motion for usb devices my virtual switch called it and attached the Network card too it. I ensure the option for "allow management operating system to share this

Network adapter" was installed on systems host os / Hypervisor my Omen-PC to have any connection with this adapter

Additional Screenshots are Available at the end/Appendix of this document for this section see Fig 7.0 Network Switch HyperV

Step 3: Securing the Virtual Machine on the Hypervisor

Let's you conduct questionable activity via an anonymous network for research purposes as an ethical professional.

The next step was to secure the virtual machines on the hypervisor, let's start with the Windows Server. My configuration for this was to enable secure boot , this prevents unauthorised code from running when the virtual machine boots up , Enable trusted platform Module alongside enabling Shielding all of these steps ensure a more secure and resilient virtual machine. I also configured the checkpoints for the virtual machine for if and when we need to revert back. One additional option I had was to enable BitLocker should I required it I chose for the lab not to but in a normal product environment you would enable this.

For Linux I didn't have allot of options as it doesn't natively additional configuration for secure boot and other configurations, but I did enable checkpoints for this as well.

Step 4: Test virtual Machine interconnectivity and test Virtual machine connections to other networks.

First step was to confirm the virtual machine IP Address for both systems in cmd or terminal , the next step was to ping both virtual machines from each other and then try to ping outside of the 192.168.50.1/24 network which is the Lab network , confirmed I was unable to do so due to the policies in place which would be correct , tried to complete a scan with Advanced IP scanner of other networks ranges , nothing was discoverable , confirmed isolation via conducting these activities.

Step 5: Additional Safety and Precautions

As part of the lab requirements, we were required to ensure that some security was in place and to call out some additional Steps which could be taken to ensure

Virtual machine security, this is just 3 examples of how I did this.

- Clipboard and network discovery were turned off; this can be a local policy.
- Drag and drop was disabled, this can be a local policy
- Vm snapshots could be taken via checkpoints in Hyper-V manager, this should be enabled as we may inject malware as part of the testing process at some point.

Checkpoints in Hyper-V [5]

Additional Screenshots are Available at the end/Appendix of this document for this section see Fig 8.0 Virtual Machines interconnections and testing.

6. Section 2: Research-based Malware Analysis (QBOT)

Introduction

As part of our continuous assessment, we were required to research a form of Malware in my case the Research was based on a Malware called QBot, on first search this came up with a few names QBot is actually known under many aliases, some include “Qakbot, Quack Bot or Pinkslipbot” [6]3 very quirky names for it, its sector of speciality is the banking sector and is very well known in this sector. The Malware made its first debut in 2007 its more formally known as a type of Trojan. Since 2007 QBot has been continually developing over the year now going on 18 Years’s it started originally as a loader but has sense integrated with other malware types and form one example Conti one similar, we have seen in the HSE attack. QBot since its first up brining original designed to steal banking information has evolved into something much bigger its now able to self-replicates across devices servers and workstations and it learns every time it grows.

To further investigate the QBot Malware family the requirement here was to utilise research-based methods Understand the malware better and how it spreads and traverses across systems, networks, shares and exchange systems from my research I discovered that QBots desired form of delivery was within email attachments and document’s often disguising itself as legitimate documents but later becoming evident it had ulterior motives, some of QBot main selling points in terms of destruction were

Performing keylogging functions on hosts which were compromised by its malware, meaning it could record user keystrokes and password’s. In line with

performing keylogging functions it was passing on the stored passwords to third party cnc servers which resulted in the private information being sold to black markets

Another speciality it had was to create background tasks and schedules on individuals’ systems unknown to the targeted user it was actually creating these without any form of visible changes from there after the persistent methods were created it could traverse across the network at quieter times. As part of the malware analyses research, I looked into this more to understand the rate and infection chain at which the malware performed.


Part A: Identification

So the attack chain from my understanding starts with an unsuspecting user receiving an attachment, this can take the form of an Excel file or a pdf, normally it’s a Macro file that must be opened in excel and something that requires a user to specifically be forced to enable the live content deceptively and unknown to them. This can also come in the form of a zip file as again it would require the user to actually extract it and then run it. When the user extracts the file what the file does it creates three items, one a request that cannot be seen by the user, two a file in a location they cant see and then normally a scheduled task as at this point the file has been deposited into the hidden directory, it will stay here for some time and report back to its cnc server after a period of time, it lays in the system until it has fully unloaded all its dll’s and components, part of the malware spends its time evading antivirus and antimalware components often bringing with it obfuscations so that both the users and systems don’t know it exists this takes many forms and by the time its found usually its two late.

Based on the research into the file types I was able to see that the malware obfuscated itself as Html files, URL’s, fake voicemails /audio attachments for users to open alongside encrypted attachments like Macros and adobe reader files, all of which if they pass the through inspections pose a threat to user’s based on my research into the Threllix article [7].

The Attack Chain Diagram

Diagram Of Attack Chain: For this I used Draw.io to create the diagram which is an open-source diagram tool software used by IT Professionals to draw out their diagrams. [4]



Part B: Analysis

In the initialisation phase we see the user getting a malicious email with an attachment the user presumes this is legit as there are no indicator telling them its not.

In the execution phase we see the user opening the malicious html file with the provided password user only sees one file double clicks it mounts , this begins the process of launching malicious and unsuspecting configurations and changes to windows task scheduler , windows registry and creating the exe all in quick succession , the user only see's the exe but there are hidden files already the encryption process has started as the payload has been requested from the cnc server

In the communication the user does not see the attacker already beginning the process of reconnaissance or lateral movement this happens unknowingly to the User the system at this point is compromised and the attacker looks for additional hosts across the network.

if we take all these as one Flow, we can see the process of the attack flow based on my understanding of it very simplified, but it covers the flow.

7. Looking at the flow of QBot in more detail

Part A, The initialization stage.

QBot initiates with a .exe file, in this execution QBot looks to see if it has been launched in a sandbox environment or a real environment, it looks for the file "C:\INTERNAL__empty" if this file exists it wont run as it understands that's its in a sandbox environment and won't cause any real damage at this point. If it detects its not in a a sandbox environment it will look for a list of known antivirus /antimalware products this is more

of an adaptive countermeasure so that QBot knows how to adjust to the installed AV. [8]

Part B, The fingerprint stage/ Preparation.

QBot initiates the process of fingerprinting the computer before injecting its chosen poison, this will take into effect its previous scan to check which antivirus/antimalware product was installed knowing how to adapt its chosen injection method based on this QBot will try to inject itself into different windows process and antimalware and antivirus processes one could be explorer.exe for example. [8]

Part C, The injection Stage

QBot then continues its process by saving its chosen injection method to disk and continuing to corrupt this, it then goes back to its saved configuration file which was previously stored on the disk and scans the library for needed resources as part of the injection process , it then writes this to the disk and windows registry after this to ensure persistence QBot adds a random folder into the "%APPDATA%\Microsoft" so that the injection can be persistent. QBot repeats the process for all users' login to the effected machine. [8]

Part D, Service Account creation

QBot initiates the process of restoring all its data into the disk and registry, it creates new scheduled tasks which perform the creation of the QBot Service account using "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM", this later helps it to re process parts A, B And C for persistence. At this point QBot has injected the machine corrupted the disk created the tasks and created its service account. [8]

Part E, System Events Control

QBot installs and leaves a copy of its malicious binary files into the CurrentVersion folder for users which allows it to control scheduled tasks processes and reboot and shutdown events. After a reboot of this the evidence of the files is removed from the folders. A monitor like services / events being to occur on the machine allowing QBot to connect with its cnc server, these Ip Addresses are randomized so the individual cannot determine the validity, nor can they trace them.

Part F, Domain Lustrs and connections

QBot begins the process of loading communication with domains and installing them into the registry for

communication, these are then written to the configuration files which are stored in the registry. From the QBot continues with installing other features like Vnc Servers and more.

8. Part C:

C 1 Conclusion/Summary of Findings

The overall conclusion from my understanding of QBolt is a fast-moving malware, it's opportunistic with its ability to come in many different formats, XML Html, Excel, Macro and so on. Its ability to be able to self-spread and cohesively deceive system processes and procedures especially for Anti-Virus and Malware programs make it top tier in terms of deception and functionality. Its smart nature to be able to begin the process of execution and lay low allows it to remain hidden on systems for a period of time the deception it perform against users makes it that bit more tricky to spot or isolate , with QBolt being continually developed and popularity for it growing e.g. Conti it means that's its not going anywhere anytime soon, further research into it should be conducted in how to mitigate the threats it proposes.

C 2 Recommendations

Some of the recommendations you can take from researching into QBolt based on the fact that it has a high probability of attacking Microsoft windows os and server environments is.

- Utilising active directory and group policy management to ensure baselines are created for machine by disabling non required Microsoft office settings such as Macros.
- Utilising active directory and group policy management to ensure scheduled tasks cannot be created by new service accounts and can only be authorised from domain controller group policy management, disabling the ability for QBot to create its own processes.
- Ensure that whatever enterprise level Anti-Virus, Anti-Malware and Anti-Ransomware solutions your using corporate endpoint detection and response behavioural analytics into he solution with the ability to report to a security operation centre and ingest into a siem solution like Microsoft Sentinel.

C 3 Next Steps

If I had more time with the QBot analysis, I would have loved to actually perform the malware analysis myself , utilising some of the tools I previously mentioned getting practical and testing it out would have been beneficial , with the scope of paper to report on and

research the malware having been able to analyse the process , dig deeper into the memory dumps and monitor the traffic with Wireshark would have provided for an insightful and eye opener for getting hands on with the malware , I definitely plan to test this out in my last at some point.

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11. Appendices

Appendix Fig 2.0 Host Hyper-V machine lab network configuration

The image displays a Windows desktop environment with several windows open, illustrating the network configuration of a Hyper-V host.

System Information Window:

Name	Value
OS Name	Microsoft Windows 11 Pro
Version	10.0.22H2.0 build 22H2
Other OS Description	Not available
OS Manufacturer	Microsoft Corporation
System Name	OmenPC
System Manufacturer	HP
System Model	Omen30L Desktop DT10-Den
System Type	x64-based PC
System SKU	1Y08EAABUJ
Processor	Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-13420F CPU @ 2.80GHz, 2301 MHz, 6 Cores, 12 Logical...
BIOS Version/Date	AMF.F.26, 08/11/2023
SMBIOS Version	3.2
Embedded Controller Version	26.20
BIOS Mode	UEFI
Keyboard Manufacturer	HP
Keyboard Product	8754
Keyboard Version	00
Platform Role	Desktop
Secure Boot State	On
PCAT Configuration	Elevation Required to View
Windows Directory	C:\WINDOWS
System Directory	C:\WINDOWS\System32
Boot Device	Volume{F48D4818-8162-4...
Locale	United Kingdom
Hardware Abstraction Layer	Version = "10.0.22H2.0"
Uptime	880 days, 19 hours
Time Zone	GMT Summer Time
Installed Physical Memory (RAM)	48.0 GB
Total Physical Memory	47.9 GB
Available Physical Memory	30.3 GB
Total Virtual Memory	303 GB
Available Virtual Memory	29.3 GB
Page File Space	3.00 GB
Page File	C:\pagefile.sys
Kernel DMA Protection	On
Virtualization-Based Security	Running

Command Prompt Window:

```

Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.22H2.0.4351]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\mbrowne>hostname
Omen-PC

C:\Users\mbrowne>ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter vEthernet (Default Switch):

   Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
   Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::b9f:d4c:9042:7f6434
   IPv4 Address. . . . . : 172.16.1.1
   Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
   Default Gateway . . . . . : 

Wireless LAN adapter Local Area Connection 1:

   Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

Wireless LAN adapter Local Area Connection 2:

   Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

Wireless LAN adapter WiFi:

   Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : lan
   IPv6 Address. . . . . : fe80::f281:7f36:cd48:d643:2a6c:389f:8996
   Temporary IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::f281:7f36:cd48:31d5:6d29:93da:1908
   Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::366d:38cf:7558:195a13
   IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.0.16
   Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
   Default Gateway . . . . . : 192.168.0.1

Ethernet adapter Bluetooth Network Connection:

   Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

C:\Users\mbrowne>
    
```

File Explorer Window:

Shows the 'Devices and drives' section with the following disk information:

- Local Disk (C:): 768 GB free of 930 GB
- Backup Omen PC (D:): 1.52 TB free of 1.81 TB
- Spare Space (E): 931 GB free of 931 GB

Command Prompt Window (Bottom):

```

Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.22H2.0.4351]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\mbrowne>hostname
Omen-PC

C:\Users\mbrowne>
    
```

Appendix Fig 3.0 Windows virtual machine

Test Windows Server 2025 on OMEN-PC - Virtual Machine Connection

File Action Media View Help

System Information

System Information

System Summary

Item	Value
OS Name	Microsoft Windows Server 2025 Standard
Version	10.0.26100 Build 26100
Other OS Description	Not Available
OS Manufacturer	Microsoft Corporation
System Name	SERVER-TEST
System Manufacturer	Microsoft Corporation
System Model	Virtual Machine
System Type	x64-based PC
System SKU	None
Processor	Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-10400F CPU @ 2.90GHz, 2904 Mhz, 3 Core(s), 6 Logical Pr...
BIOS Version/Date	Microsoft Corporation Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1, 11/21/2024
SMBIOS Version	3.1
Embedded Controller Version	255.255
BIOS Mode	UEFI
BaseBoard Manufacturer	Microsoft Corporation
BaseBoard Product	Virtual Machine
BaseBoard Version	Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1
Platform Role	Desktop
Secure Boot State	On
PCR7 Configuration	Not Available
Windows Directory	C:\WINDOWS
System Directory	C:\WINDOWS\system32
Boot Device	\Device\HarddiskVolume1
Locale	United States
Hardware Abstraction Layer	Version = "10.0.26100.1"
User Name	Not Available

Find what: Find Close Tuesday, June 24, 2025

Search selected category only Search category names only

Search

Virtual Machines

Name	State	CPU Usage	Assigned Memory	Uptime	Status	Configurat...
Test Kali 2025	Running	0%	4812 MB	01:12:14	12.0	
Test Windows Server 2025	Running	0%	2054 MB	01:14:12	12.0	

Settings for Test Windows Server 2025 on OMEN-PC

Test Windows Server 2025

Hardware

- Add Hardware
- Firmware
 - Boot from File
- Security
 - Secure Boot
- Memory
 - 2048 MB
- Processor
 - 2 Virtual processors
- SCSI Controller
- Hard Drive
 - New Virtual Machine_D:\CC17A...
- Network Adapter
 - MalwareAnalyst.ab

Management

- Name
 - Test Windows Server 2025
- Integration Services
 - Close services offered
- Checkpoints
 - Standard
- Smart Paging File Location
 - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windo...
- Automatic Start Action
 - Restart if previously running
- Automatic Stop Action
 - Save

Security

Secure Boot

Use Secure Boot to help prevent unauthorized code from running at boot time (recommended).

Enable Secure Boot

Firmware: Microsoft Windows

Encryption Support

Enable Trusted Platform Module

A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a special purpose microprocessor which provides cryptographic services for a computer platform.

Encrypt state and virtual machine migration traffic

Encryption support requires a legacy protection (LP) configuration for the virtual machine. If not already present, selecting one of these options will generate a KIP that allows running the virtual machine on this host.

Security Policy

Specify additional protection options for the virtual machine:

Enable Shielding

This affects additional settings.

Learn more about virtual machine security.

Some settings cannot be modified because the virtual machine was in the following state when this window was opened: running. To modify a setting that is unavailable, shut down the virtual machine and then reopen this window.

OK Cancel Apply

Test Windows Server 2025

Created: 17/06/2025 19:21:03

Appendix Fig 4.0 Kali Linux virtual machine

Hyper-V Manager

File Action View Help

Hyper-V Manager

OMEN-PC

Virtual Machines

Name	State	CPU Usage	Assigned Memory	Uptime	Status	Configurat...
Test Kali 2025	Running	0%	4812 MB	01:17:06	12.0	
Test Windows Server 2025	Running	0%	2118 MB	01:18:08	12.0	

Settings for Test Kali 2025 on OMEN-PC

Test Kali 2025

Hardware

- Add Hardware
- Firmware
 - Boot from Hard Drive
- Security
 - Secure Boot disabled
- Memory
 - 2048 MB
- Processor
 - 2 Virtual processors
- SCSI Controller
- Hard Drive
 - Hard Drive 2048 MB, 2 Hyper-V Hard...
- Network Adapter
 - MalwareAnalyst.ab
- Hyper-V Shared

Management

- Name
 - Test Kali 2025
- Integration Services
 - Close services offered
- Checkpoints
 - Standard
- Smart Paging File Location
 - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windo...
- Automatic Start Action
 - Restart if previously running
- Automatic Stop Action
 - Save

Processor

You can modify the number of virtual processors based on the number of processors on the physical computer. You can also modify other resource control settings.

Number of virtual processors: 2

Resource control

You can use resource controls to balance resources among virtual machines.

Virtual machine reserve (percentage): 0

Percent of total system resources: 0

Virtual machine limit (percentage): 100

Percent of total system resources: 36

Relative weight: 100


Hyper-V is not configured to enable processor resource controls. Learn more about Hyper-V processor configuration options.

Some settings cannot be modified because the virtual machine was in the following state when this window was opened: running. To modify a setting that is unavailable, shut down the virtual machine and then reopen this window.

OK Cancel Apply

Test Kali 2025

Created: 17/06/2025 18:19:27




Appendix Fig 6.0 IP Allocation/reservation

The screenshot displays the DHCP Reservation table in the Omada web interface. The table lists various reserved IP addresses and their corresponding network configurations. The following table represents the data shown in the screenshot:

MAC ADDRESS	IP ADDRESS	DHCP OPTIONS	NETWORK	DESCRIPTION	ENABLED	CLIENT NAME	ACTION
00-31-82-76-3F-E2	192.168.0.119		Core Network	Core Switch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	00-31-82-76-3F-E2	Edit Delete
00-00-C0-42-46-C8	192.168.0.124		Core Network	My Cloud Ultra	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MyCloudC20R4	Edit Delete
00-00-C0-34-8B-E1	192.168.0.125		Core Network	My Cloud Home	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MyCloud40000N	Edit Delete
00-09-0A-78-70-24	192.168.0.126		Core Network	Ring Security Base	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	00-09-0A-78-70-24	Edit Delete
64-16-68-A5-82-04	192.168.0.133		Core Network	Intel	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	00A014C2319911C	Edit Delete
3C-84-60-80-18	192.168.0.139		Core Network	OC 200 OMADA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3C-84-60-80-18	Edit Delete
5C-62-68-73-44-74	192.168.0.8		Core Network	Core Switch 18P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	5C-62-68-73-44-74	Edit Delete
AC-15-A2-06-4F-CD	192.168.0.149		Core Network	Core Switch 28P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AC-15-A2-06-4F-CD	Edit Delete
2C-8E-ED-49-FF-61	192.168.0.159		Core Network	-	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Santitas	Edit Delete
F0-09-02-7C-0C	192.168.0.210		Core Network	AP01 Hallway New05	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	F0-09-02-7C-0C	Edit Delete
A8-6E-84-57-3D-E2	192.168.0.152		Core Network	AP02 Kitchen New05	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A8-6E-84-57-3D-E2	Edit Delete
F0-09-02-78-99-58	192.168.0.209		Core Network	AP03 Office New05	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	F0-09-02-78-99-58	Edit Delete
A8-6E-84-57-40-2A	192.168.0.153		Core Network	AP04 TV Room New05	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A8-6E-84-57-40-2A	Edit Delete
90-8A-62-02-AE-C6	192.168.0.5		Core Network	AP Ty Room 2 (Older AP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	90-8A-62-02-AE-C6	Edit Delete
90-8A-62-02-AD-C6	192.168.0.120		Core Network	JP 180y Room (Older AP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	90-8A-62-02-AD-C6	Edit Delete
00-A4-87-E4-89-E2	192.168.0.2		Core Network	Gateway AP (Older AP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	00-A4-87-E4-89-E2	Edit Delete
00-15-02-00-11-81	192.168.50.2		Lab Network	Server Test	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Server Test	Edit Delete
00-15-02-00-11-80	192.168.50.1		Lab Network	Server K8S	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Server K8S	Edit Delete

Appendix Fig 7.0 Network switch hyperV




Appendix Fig 8.0 Virtual machines interconnections and testing

Advanced IP Scanner Tests to below VLAN's

1. Lab Network is 192.168.50.1/24


We can see here advanced IP Scanner can see 3 devices

- Server-Test, Windows Test Server
- Kali Linux, Kali Linux Server
- Omada Gateway, Firewall/Router




2. IOT Network is 192.168.20.1/24

We can see here advanced IP Scanner can see nothing on this VLAN , Thanks to the rules on the IOT VLAN Which I created earlier.




3. Guest Network is 192.168.40.1/24

We can see here advanced IP Scanner can see nothing on this VLAN, Thanks to the rules on the Guest VLAN Which I created earlier.



4. CCTV Network is 192.168.30.1/24

We can see here advanced IP Scanner can see nothing on this VLAN , Thanks to the rules on the CCTV VLAN Which I created earlier.



5. Home Network is 192.168.0.1/24

We can see here advanced IP Scanner can see nothing on this VLAN , Thanks to the rules on the Home VLAN Which I created earlier.




FIG 8.1, Kali IP Configuration




FIG 8.2, Windows IP Configuration




FIG 8.6, Testing of Ping to other networks

This comes from windows (Nothing should work beyond lab)




FIG 8.7, Testing of Ping to other networks

e.g. hypervisor on 192.168.0.16 From Kali (Nothing should work beyond lab)




FIG 8.8, Joe Sandbox

The screenshot displays the Joe Sandbox Cloud interface for a 'BASIC' account. The top navigation bar includes a search bar, 'Analyze' and 'Results' buttons, and a 'Register' button. The main content area is divided into two steps:

- 1 Choose Analysis Architecture**: This step offers five options for the analysis architecture: Windows, macOS, Android, Linux, and Advanced. Each option is represented by a platform-specific icon.
- 2 Define Sample Source and Choose Analysis System**: This step is further divided into three sections:
 - Upload Sample**: Contains a 'Choose file(s)' button and a warning: 'Make sure to use the original sample name. Do not rename samples!'. Below this is a text input field.
 - Browse URL**: Contains a text input field for entering a URL.
 - More Options**: Contains two buttons: 'Download & Execute File' and 'Command Line'.

Under the 'Choose Analysis System' section, there is a dropdown menu with the text 'Select up to 4 of 4 available systems.' and a list of available systems. The first system, 'w10x64', is selected and highlighted. Its details are listed below:

- 10x w10x64
- Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 114, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8, Update 381, 7zip 23 01